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J. RODNEY JOHNSON 
The Optimum Marital Deduction Survives 
the Tax Reform Act 
SEVERAL years ago an article appeared in the pages of this journal which suggested that those 
attorneys who regularly focused on obtaining the 
maximum marital deduction in the wills they were 
drafting for their clients might be suffering from a 
form of estate planner's myopia.1 That is, they were 
losing sight of their ultimate goal of minimizing the 
total estate tax burden imposed on the husband's 
assets as they pass from him, through the wife, on to 
the ultimate beneficiaries. The danger foreseen was 
that, as an attorney employed one of the various 
formula clauses designed to obtain every possible 
dollar of marital deduction at the husband's death, 
the attorney might also unwittingly and unnecessarily 
increase the estate tax burden at the wife's later 
death. A study based on a computer simulation of 
28,000 cases was referred to which indicated that ( 1) 
drafting for the maximum marital deduction would 
have been appropriate in only 10% of the cases 
whereas ( 2) the marital deduction should not have 
been used at all in 55 % of the cases and ( 3) the 
entire estate should have been transferred to the wife 
in 21 % of the cases. Accordingly, it was concluded 
that •instead of striving for the maximum marital 
deduction, the attorney should be searching for the 
optimal transfer from husband to wife-the amount 
that will "set the stage," so to speak, for the lowest 
overall estate tax bill for husband and wife together, 
even though this amount may not take full ad-
vantage of the marital deduction. 
Sometimes it is much easier to devise a theory 
which will solve a problem than it is to implement 
that particular theory from a practical standpoint. 
1 Johnson, Drafting for the Optimum Marital Deduction, 
I Va. Bar Assn. J. 3 (July 1975). 
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And the practical problem in drafting for the opti-
mum marital deduction is that all of the variables 
which it is necessary to resolve in order to determine 
the amount of the optimum transfer from the husband 
to the wife are all unknown at the time the husband's 
will is drawn. These variables include, among others: 
( 1 ) the size of the husband's estate at the time of his 
death, ( 2) the size of the wife's estate at the time of 
the husband's death, ( 3) the after tax rate of return 
of the wife and the children at the time of the hus-
band's death, and ( 4) the life expectancy of the 
wife at the husband's death. The solution offered to 
this problem of the unknown variables was simply to 
postpone the ultimate decision about the size of the 
transfer from the husband to the wife until after the 
date of the husband's death, at which time most of 
the above variables would either have become known 
or at least estimable with a greater degree of ac-
curacy. The procedure suggested to effect this post-
poned decision was to leave the entire estate to the 
wife and then allow her, with advice of counsel, to 
determine the optimum transfer and then to disclaim 
the ownership of (but not the benefit from) the re-
maining portion of the husband's estate. This action 
would result in the property so disclaimed being ex-
cluded from the wife's gross estate at her later death, 
even though she retained the benefit therefrom for the 
rest of her life. The only property that would be in-
cluded in her gross estate would be the optimum 
portion of her husband's estate of which she had ac-
cepted ownership. The article concluded by present-
ing "form" language that might be used by an at-
torney desiring to employ the optimum marital de-
duction concept, a general discussion of the problems 
and opportunities therein, and its integration with 
existing Virginia law. 
1 n the spring of 19 7 G the federal government issued 
Rev. Rul. 76-1562 which, though not aimed at the 
above plan, nevertheless came down hard on the 
use of disclaimers and placed the above procedure for 
obtaining the optimum marital deduction clearly in 
jeopardy. Accordingly, an update to the original 
article was published in these pages in which the 
ruling in question was discussed and a minor modi-
fication to the original procedure was outlined which 
would preserve the essence of the above plan and 
render it invulnerable to successful attack under the 
revenue ruling in question.3 
Now, in the wake of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 
it becomes necessary to write what it is hoped will 
be the final portion of this unintended trilogy. First 
of all the good news~the essence of the original plan 
still survives. Moreover, the concept of drafting for 
the optimum marital deduction has even greater 
validity after TRA '76 than it did under prior law. 
This greater validity is due to three primary factors: 
( 1) the introduction of several new variables in the 
amount of the marital deduction and in the amount 
of the unified credit which now make it even more 
difficult to determine the optimum marital transfer 
at the time of drafting the will, ( 2) the minimum 
effective estate tax rate of 3 2 % (after the unified 
credit is fully phased in) which requires the estate 
planner to pay increasing attention to the amount of 
assets exposed to estate taxes, whether this exposure 
be at the husband's death or the wife's death, and to 
eliminate as far as possible all double exposure, and 
( 3) the new statutory recognition of disclaimers in 
federal law.4 
Moreover, it is no more difficult to employ the 
optimum marital deduction disclaimer concept after 
TRA '76 than it was under prior law. An attorney 
wishing to structure a will to take advantage of this 
option will find that it requires very few changes to 
his basic marital-deduction will form. He would begin 
just as usual, to-wit : 
1. Divide the estate into two shares with 
whatever formula clause is regularly used, 
the appropriate shate going into the "Mari-
tal" trust and the other share going into 
the "Family" trust. 
2 I.R.C. 1976-17, 22. 
3 Johnson, An Attack on the Optimum Marital Deduction: 
Rcuenue Ruling 76-176, 2 Va. Bar Assn. J. 10 (Summer 
1976). 
4 I.R.C. ~ 2.118, which is also incorporated by reference into 
I.R.C. § 204.'i. 
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a. The "Marital" trust will provide that 
( 1 ) Wife gets all income for life, 
( 2) Trustee has power to invade cor-
pus for wife's benefit, and 
( 3) Wife has an inter vivas and testa-
mentary power of appointment 
over the corpus, exercisable in 
favor of herself, H's kindred and 
the spouses of H's kindred, with a 
remainder to the "family" trust to 
the extent that wife fails to exer-
cise her power. 
b. The "Family" trust will provide that 
( 1) Wife gets all of the income for life, 
( 2) Trustee has power to invade cor-
pus for wife's benefit, but 
( 3) Instead of giuing wife a special 
testamentary power of appoint-
ment exercisable among the chil-
dren, she is giuen an inter 1•ivos 
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and testamentary power of ap-
pointment, exercisable in favor 
of herself, H's kindred and the 
spouses of H's kindred, with an 
appropriate remainder in default 
of exercise. 
2. The "Disclaimer Clause" will provide that: 
In the event that my wife ( X) should dis-
claim the power ( s) of appointment granted 
her in Article ________ , above, either as to all 
of my estate or to any undivided portion 
thereof, then, as to such property over 
which the power has been so disclaimed, 
I give XYZ Bank these power ( s) of a p-
pointment, to be exercisable in favor of 
my wife, my kindred, and spouses of my 
kindred; to be exercised as the XYZ Bank, 
in the sole exercise of its absolute discre-
tion, shall determine to be best in the 
light of circumstances existing at the time 
of such exercise. The power(s) of appoint-
ment herein given to the XYZ Bank may 
be exercised at any time or times during 
my said wife's lifetime, 
a. By deed presently operative which is de-
livered during the lifetime of my said 
wife, or 
b. By a testamentary writing in the nature 
of a will which is ( 1 ) designed to be-
come operative simultaneously with the 
death of my said wife and ( 2) shall be 
revocable during her lifetime. 
To the extent that the power( s) are not 
validly exercised, the property subject to 
the powers shall be paid over to and be-
come a part of. the "Family" trust as it is 
constituted immediately after the death of 
my said wife. 
While the overall operation of the optimum marital 
deduction disclaimer plan remains in general as 
described in the earlier articles, to which the reader 
is hereby referred, it is necessary to make a few 
comments concerning the present modifications. First 
of all, the rather cumbersome description of the ob-
jects of the powers in the marital and family trusts 
("herself, H's kindred and the spouses of H's kin-
dred") is mandated by a literal reading of IRC 
§ 2518 ( b) ( 4) which requires that a disclaimed power 
must pass to another in order to be recognized as a 
"qualified disclaimer." The cumbersome language re-
ferred to above is drafted with a view in mind of 
( 1) giving the wife her general power of appoint-
ment to use as necessary and ( 2) giving the fiduciary 
bank the power to appoint among the natural objects 
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of the husband's bounty if the power passes to the 
bank by way of disclaimer. Secondly, paralleling the 
position taken above of giving the successor donee 
the power to appoint to precisely the same objects as 
the original donee, it is provided that the successor 
donee must operate in precisely the same time frame 
and manner of appointment as the original donee (by 
deed delivered or instrument in the nature of a will 
executed in the lifetime of the wife) . While it seems 
that IRC § 2518 (b) ( 4) was inadvertently made 
applicable to powers and that future regulations 
will clarify the matter, prudence demands that the 
above conservative approach be taken until that 
time. Finally, on the matter of partial disclaimers, 
IRC § 2518 ( c) ( 1) speaks in terms of disclaiming an 
"undivided portion" of an interest. Again, conserva-
tive drafting dictates expressing the quantum of the 
disclaimer in terms of an undivided portion, rather 
than a specific amount, in order to insure that the 
donee is making a "qualified disclaimer" as that term 
is defined in IRC § 2518 (b). 
In conclusion, it is believed that the need for 
optimizing the marital-deduction is even greater after 
the passage of TRA '76 than it was before, and that 
the procedure presented in these articles is even 
sounder now that the subject of disclaiming powers 
of appointment is expressly treated in IRC § 2518.5 
5 It is believed that any question concerning the soundness 
of this concept was laid to rest on April 28, 1977, when House 
Ways and Means Chairman Al Ullman introduced H.R. 
6715, "The Technical Corrections Act of 1977," which is 
designed to make "technical, clerical and conforming" amend-
ments to the Tax Reform Act of 1976. 
Section 3 ( m) of the Bill "clarifies" the original intent of 
Congress in the enactment of the new disclaimer section, 
I.R.C. ~ 2518. The official summary of the Bill, prepared by 
the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, explains this 
"clarifying" change as follows: 
It is presently unclear as to whether a disclaimer is valid 
for tax purposes where a surviving spouse refuses to ac-
cept all or a portion of an interest in property passing 
from the decedent and, as a result of that refusal, the 
property passes to a trust in which the spouse has an 
income interest. The bill provides that, where a surviving 
spouse refuses to accept an interest in property, the dis-
claimer will be valid although the surviving spouse re-
ceives an income interest with respect to the property if 
the income interest does not result from any direction 
by the surviving spouse and the disclaimer is otherwise 
qualified. Summary, pages 29-30. 
This "clarification" goes far beyond the relatively con-
servative procedure of disclaiming a power of appointment 
which passes completely to another and, assuming that this 
"clarification" remains in the Technical Corrections Act when 
it is passed this fall, any doubt concerning the concept de-
scribed in this series of articles should cease. 
